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Introduction 
 
In this paper I want to reflect upon regional economic change and the ways in 
which this is conceptualised and understood, drawing heavily but not 
exclusively on some thirty years of research on economy, politics and society 
in the north east of England (see Hudson, 2000). The economy of this region 
been transformed from a booming core in the nineteenth century to a 
marginalised and near-bust periphery by the end of the twentieth century, 
while the region has been blighted by widespread poverty and inequality 
throughout this long period. The principal question that this paper addresses, 
therefore, is this: how are the long periods of continuity, punctuated by 
occasional major shifts, in developmental trajectory and the region‟s place in 
the global economy, allied to the persistence in socio-spatial inequalities 
within the region,1 to be understood? 
 
In the nineteenth century, the north east was one of the birth places of 
industrial capitalism, a new industrial region materially and discursively 
constructed in a space that was formerly largely occupied by a pre-capitalist 
and non-industrial economy and society. It became a veritable „workshop of 
the world‟, at the core of capitalist production, the British Empire and an 
emerging nineteenth century globalising economy, built around coal, iron and 
steel, engineering (notably shipbuilding, armaments, and railways) and 
chemicals. Now it is an “old” industrial region, with very little remaining of the 
growth industries of the nineteenth century. To use the adjectives “old” and 
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“new” in relation to industrial regions is simply to acknowledge that the nature 
of capitalism ensures that all industries at some point become "old”, as, in a 
sense, do the regions in which they are – or were  - embedded. 
 
The extent and pace of decline in the last quarter of the twentieth century was 
nonetheless spectacular. As a result, and in strong contrast to the nineteenth 
century, the north east is now a profoundly deindustrialised region on the 
periphery of the European Union and on the margins of the global economy. It 
is very largely disconnected from the decisive circuits of capital and the major 
growth mechanisms of the contemporary capitalist economy. As a result, not 
only have the “old” industries largely disappeared but there has been at best a 
partial and weak “re-industrialisation” via the endogenous growth of “new” 
industries or the introduction of “old” industries (such as automobile or 
consumer electronics production) that are “new” to the north east. 
 
In short, the north east has experienced a long wave of growth followed by 
decline (Mandel, 1978), although with cyclical fluctuations around this long 
term trend. Throughout, however, the region has been characterised by deep 
intra-regional socio-spatial inequality (for example, in terms of incomes, 
wealth, health and living conditions). This was the case from the boom years 
of the nineteenth century to the profound economic decline that set in during 
the last quarter of the twentieth century. In the nineteenth century north east 
England was and now still is a region marked by intra-regional inequalities as 
nineteenth century liberalism was echoed by late twentieth century neo-
                                                                                                                                            
1
 The re-invigorated debate as to how best to conceptualise „the region‟ is summarised in 
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liberalism in national politics and the dominant conception of the national 
political economy.  Intra-regional socio-spatial inequality has remained a 
constant characteristic in its trajectory of growth and decline.  
 
Seeking to explain the region‟s particular sequence of growth and decline, 
combined to persistent intra-regional inequality, requires drawing upon a 
variety of theoretical perspectives.  A critical insight of Marxian political-
economy is that uneven development, including spatially uneven 
development, is structurally embedded within the capitalist mode of 
production (CMP) and economies dominated by it. It stresses that uneven 
development is, as it were, genetically encoded into the CMP. This 
emphasises the broader structural determination of regional uneven 
development and contextualises the possibilities for regional autonomy and 
pro-activity. However, while such a highly abstract approach can identify key 
causal mechanisms and the necessary structural relations that define the 
CMP as capitalist, it cannot reveal which regions will grow and prosper, which 
will decline. Nor can it reveal which fractions of the classes of capital and 
labour, in which regions, will „win‟ and „lose‟ as an integral part of the 
dynamism of such processes.  
 
A further related limitation of such a structural analysis is that it cannot 
uncover how the strategies and practices of capital, states, and workers 
combine in complex ways to create regions that become critical nodes in the 
accumulation process and regions that become marginal to it. Equally, and 
                                                                                                                                            
Hudson, 2001, Chapter 9, and Hudson, 2003a. 
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critically, it cannot reveal the mechanisms through which regions change from 
being focal points in processes of growth to locations that are eviscerated by 
the flight of capital and abandonment by the (national) state as it ceases to 
regard them as locations for productive activity. Such regions are 
characterised by a „surplus population‟, at best of direct interest to capital or 
state as a source of migrant labour that could move elsewhere in search of 
work and meet labour-power demands in other regions. Nonetheless, these 
are regions that require regulation and surveillance, and forms of state 
involvement to ensure the reproduction of a population there, not least for 
reasons of political legitimacy.  
 
Answering such questions about the changing developmental trajectories of 
regions requires a different type of approach to that of Marxian political 
economy, drawing on theories grounded in other complementary strands of 
heterodox social science that seek to reveal the mechanisms, „messy 
practices‟ and emergent effects through which capitalist economies are 
performed and (un)intentionally (re)produced. In particular, I want to draw on 
strands of evolutionary and institutional approaches and upon state theory 
and concepts of governance and governmentality to seek to deepen 
understanding of the production of „old industrial regions‟. I seek to use these 
as three inter-related and to a degree overlapping perspectives through which 
to examine and seek to interpret the socio-economic development of north 
east England. As such, there is a deliberate selectivity in choice of evidence.  
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I am not therefore seeking to give a comprehensive account of the region‟s 
development and historical geography. My aim is both more focused and 
limited: that is, to explore the extent to which continuity and change in the 
region‟s developmental trajectory can be understood in terms of evolutionary 
and institutional concepts and the varying engagement of the state with issues 
of socio-economic development and change. This has important practical as 
well as theoretical implications. Not least, how does the state seek to deal 
with such regional economic problems and legitimate its activities? What is 
the capacity of the state to manage the maintenance of or changes in 
developmental trajectories? Should state policies seek to maintain existing 
developmental trajectories or seek to move regional economies onto new and 
different ones?  
 
Path dependency or path contingency? 
 
One way of seeking to understand the changing trajectories of regional growth 
and decline is to draw upon strands of evolutionary thinking, especially 
evolutionary approaches in economics that eschew biological analogy and 
emphasise that path dependence is socially constituted (Metcalfe, 1998). As 
such, path dependence is grounded in the reproduction of instituted forms of 
behaviour (which are discussed in the following section). Concepts of path 
dependency are undoubtedly useful in accounting for the long period of 
secular growth in the economy of north east England. This lasted from the 
early nineteenth century to the 1920s, albeit punctuated by sharp cyclical 
movements characteristic of the capitalist business cycle in an economy 
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dominated by a liberal mode of regulation that allowed markets great scope 
as resource allocation mechanisms. The booming regional economy was 
dominated by a small number of major conglomerates (or „coal combines‟: 
see Hudson, 1989, after Harvey, 1917), linked via a range of untraded as well 
as traded inter-dependencies (which are discussed more fully in the next 
section) that forged connections between them.  
 
Rapid regional economic growth was therefore based upon close and 
mutually reinforcing links of intra-regional traded dependencies between the 
mining of coal and the production of iron and steel, and a wide range of 
engineering products manufactured from iron and steel (armaments, ships, 
railways and so on), and chemicals. Markets for these booming industries 
were often constituted as international, rather than simply national, markets 
from the outset. Such markets were constructed within the political 
frameworks of both the formal and informal British Empires, the latter 
constituted by areas of the world that were not under formal UK political rule 
but in which UK based capital held a dominant position. For example, 
companies based in north east England had an iron grip on the market for 
constructing railways over much of south America. The combination of 
continuously growing markets and close inter-connections between the inputs 
to and outputs from production processes in the north east created a virtuous 
spiral of path dependent growth. This served the interests of the owners of 
capital and of the coal combines in the region well for around a century. 
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If, however, this was a successful and path dependent trajectory of growth, 
the conditions on which it relied were contingent and conjunctural, albeit 
relatively stable over a long period. As such, the concept of path contingency 
captures the character of the growth process, and in particular the transition 
from growth to decline, more adequately than that of path dependency (see 
Hardy, 2002; Hudson, 2003b). There are a number of issues of particular 
significance in this context. The first is the collapse of markets, both national 
and international, for commodities produced in the north east. The second is 
the transition from a liberal to an interventionist mode of regulation of the 
regional economy, shaped by dominant capitalist interests in the region. The 
third is the shift from a social democratic politics of nationalisation and state 
ownership of key industries in a state managed region from the mid-1940s to 
mid-1970s (Hudson, 1989) to a subsequent neo-liberal politics of privatisation 
and pre- and post-privatisation rationalisation.  
 
The secular collapse of international markets for many of the industrial 
commodities produced in north east England began in the depression of the 
1920s and 1930s. As a result, whole swathes of industry in the region 
collapsed and in some cases this led to the permanent destruction of 
productive capacity. For example, in shipbuilding there was a state-sponsored 
strategy to cut capacity (Wilkenson, 1939) while in coal mining the cessation 
of pumping activities from the mines led to permanent closure due to flooding, 
especially in south west Durham (Dalton, 1953).  By and large, however, it 
involved mass unemployment rather than the mass destruction of industrial 
capacity.   
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The scale and persistence of unemployment was sufficient to generate 
political concerns and at the same time the owners of capital in the region 
began to seek new ways of promoting and protecting their interests. One 
result of this was the invention for the first time, albeit haltingly and 
uncertainly, of a nascent national government regional policy from the late 
1920s. This emergent policy concern registered that regional uneven 
development had ceased to be simply an undesirable characteristic of 
capitalist development and had become a political problem for the state. 
Prominent capitalists in the north east, coming together as the self-styled 
Northern Industrial Group, took an active role in seeking to construct this 
policy in ways that served their own interests, relying on their political power 
to do so, and became key figures in the new regional institutions established 
to develop and implement it (Hudson, 2004). Re-armament in the 1930s and 
then the war-time economy (1939-45) restored effective demand for many 
industrial commodities produced in the region and the post-war settlement 
involved the nationalisation of industries that formed key sectors of the 
regional economy (coal mining, iron and steel and the railways). While the 
nationalisation of iron and steel was short-lived, it was subsequently re-
nationalised in the 1960s while shipbuilding was nationalised in the 1970s. 
 
These various nationalisations were informed by a variety of motives, 
depending on their specific timings (Hudson, 1986). Generally, however, 
nationalisation reflected the fact that industries seen in various ways as 
central to national or regional economic performance or national interests 
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(notably in terms of defence) were no longer sufficiently profitable to attract 
the required investment in fixed assets and means of production by private 
capital. Public ownership via nationalisation in this way became a strategy to 
underpin the region‟s development trajectory around these industries, as the 
state replaced private capital as the proximate guarantor of the region‟s path 
dependent developmental strategy. It did so, however, in ways that created a 
trajectory locked-in to existing industries. For example, the newly created 
National Coal Board was confined to the mining of coal and legally prevented 
from diversifying into activities such as the manufacture of mining machinery 
and equipment – activities that remained a source of profit for other private 
sector companies (Grundy Warr, 1989). Thus this shift to the state as 
guarantor of the regional development trajectory, and of selected private 
sector interests, was politically negotiated on terms that were very favourable 
to the latter. For some it created captive markets while for others it was a 
means to liberate capital from obsolete and unprofitable fixed assets. In 
practice, nationalisation became a mechanism to restore capital to a money 
form that private sector companies could use to diversify their interests, 
spatially and sectorally. 
 
Nonetheless, those industries that were nationalised continued to decline 
within the north east. There were two main sets of reasons for this. First 
changes in the international division of labour as a consequence of the 
emergence of new centres of production for coal, steel and ships (as well as 
industries such as chemicals that remained in private ownership) in other 
parts of the world. Secondly, technological developments led to the creation of 
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alternatives to coal as an energy resource and raw material for carbon-based 
chemicals production, and to plastics and other materials as alternatives to 
steel as an industrial material. Continuing decline in the regional economy led 
to further policy responses from the state. One response, informed by political 
concerns over socio-spatial equity and maintaining the legitimacy of state 
involvement in economy and society in the region, was that national 
governments strengthened their regional policies to try and attract new private 
sector investment. Initially, this was typically in the form of branch plants in 
manufacturing and their analogous workplaces in both private and public 
service sector activities. However, while there was diversification of industries 
and sectors, there was homogenisation in terms of stage of production and 
location in value chains, with a proliferation of low skill, low value-added 
activities. These factories were “global outposts” (Beynon and Austrin, 1978), 
located at the end of corporate chains of command and control that stretched 
across the globe.  As the limits to these policies became visible over a 
number of decades, the emphasis switched more to the formation and growth 
of indigenous small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – again without 
conspicuous success (Robinson and Storey, 1981; Storey, 1982).  
 
From the mid-1970s the UK state faced growing fiscal pressures, with fears of 
a fiscal crisis of the state triggering capital flight from the national territory. In 
response, the scope and extent of state involvement in economy and society 
began to rein back as part of a transition from a social democratic to neo-
liberal mode of state engagement with economy and society (Hudson and 
Williams, 1995). Two aspects of this are particularly relevant here. The first is 
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the cutback in central government expenditure on regional policies. However, 
it was second, the privatisation and associated rationalisations of the formerly 
nationalised coal, electricity supply, steel and shipbuilding industries that was 
of greatest significance in revealing the contingent character of the 
developmental trajectory in the north east. The nationalised industries were 
increasingly unprofitable and as such were adding to public sector borrowing 
in order to ensure their continuing existence. In order to address this problem 
the state sought to dispose of these industries to private sector interests. 
Consequently, to try and render them more attractive (that is, potentially 
profitable) to private capital, the formerly close and politically mediated ties 
between the nationalised industries were broken as they were allowed to 
source and sell globally. For example, the electricity supply and steel 
industries had formed markets for coal, which disappeared as they were 
allowed to buy coal on the international market, with imports from Australia, 
Colombia, South Africa. This lead to a series of colliery closures in the north 
east (see Beynon et al, 1991). In addition, and relatedly, these industries were 
subject to successive rounds of capacity closure and job loss in the north east 
(as well as elsewhere), with the specific intention of making them more 
attractive to potential private sector purchasers. Furthermore, following 
privatisation there were further rounds of rationalisation, as the new private 
sector owners of these companies sought to make them more profitable 
(Hudson, 1998).  
 
The net result was that by the early years of the twenty first century, little 
remained in the north east of the coal, steel and shipbuilding industries: one 
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steelworks on Teesside (currently under grave threat as a result of Corus‟ 
continuing crisis and a specialisation in producing semi-finished steel), one 
shipyard on the Tyne and one deep mine (Ellington in Northumberland, the 
sole remnant of the Great Northern Coalfield and due to close in three or four 
years). There was also a few opencast (strip) mines, which had expanded 
relatively and absolutely in scale as deep mining contracted, precisely 
because their costs of production per tonne of coal were less (Beynon et al, 
2000). However, these too are now declining in extent. In addition, the 
restructuring of ICI, from a company producing commodity bulk chemicals to 
one focussed on speciality chemicals, and the subsequent fragmentation of 
the formerly integrated chemicals production structure on Teesside, and the 
elimination of swathes of heavy engineering, led to substantial capacity 
reductions. In total these industries employ around 20,000 people; even fifty 
years ago they employed about well over 400,000 in the north east – a 
reduction that provides a stark indication of the contingent character of the 
region‟s earlier developmental trajectory.  
 
 
The perils of instituted behaviour: institutional and cognitive lock-in 
 
In recent years there has been a considerable re-emphasis upon the 
„instituted‟ character of human behaviour. This is partly a result of the re-
discovery of (neo) Polanyian approaches to economic analysis, partly a 
corollary of a more general concern in parts of economics and sociology with 
the socially embedded character of action (Granovetter, 1985). There is a 
 14 
long tradition of institutional approaches in economics, but the main source of 
inspiration here is the „old‟ institutional economics of Commons and Veblen 
rather than the new institutional economics of Williamson, which is closely 
linked to neo-classical approaches (see Hodgson, 1988; 1993; Hudson, 
2001).  „Instituted‟ behaviour can be thought of as embracing a wide spectrum 
from the informality of habits, norms and routines (often unexamined and 
unthinkingly performed, symptomatic of a Gramscian hegemony of some 
ideas and ways of thinking over others) to the formality of behaviour within the 
state and its constituent apparatuses and organisations.  
 
In the 1970s and 1980s political-economy approaches to analyses of regional 
uneven development placed great emphasis on the role of extra-regional 
relationships in shaping regional (under)development trajectories. The  
“institutional turn” in analyses of regional development (Amin, 1998) led to a 
much greater emphasis upon intra-regional relationships between firms and 
between economic and non-economic processes. As well as the traded inter-
dependencies of the supply chain, appropriate “institutional thickness” (Amin 
and Thrift, 1994) and the untraded inter-dependencies of non-economic social 
and cultural ties (Storper, 1995; 1997) within an associational economy 
(Cooke and Morgan, 1998) were increasingly seen as pivotal to regional 
economic success in the late twentieth century. However, such untraded inter-
dependencies had clearly been of crucial importance in the new capitalist 
boom regions of the nineteenth century such as north east England. 
Furthermore, the importance of untraded inter-dependencies in nineteenth 
century north east England exemplifies the importance of distinguishing 
 15 
innovations in thought from actual developments in the economy that are 
being thought about (Hall, 1991). 
  
The net result of the intersection and interaction of the linkages of traded and 
untraded dependencies was to create and reproduce the conditions 
underpinning a particular growth trajectory for the regional economy. Many 
economically successful regions, including for a time north east England, can 
therefore be seen to possess an appropriate institutional thickness, one that 
underpinned and supported economic activities located within the region, and 
helped reproduce regionally-specific competencies, tacit knowledge and trust, 
regarded as critical determinants of continuing economic well-being. 
Conversely, however, an inappropriate institutional thickness, often a relict 
form from an earlier era when it was supportive of regional economic success, 
can act as a barrier to moving a regional economy onto a new and more 
promising developmental trajectory (Hudson, 1994), revealing “the weakness 
of strong ties” (Grabher, 1993). Just as economic growth in north east 
England in the nineteenth century had been grounded in a supportive 
institutional formation, by the late twentieth century its legacies and relict form 
constituted a barrier to a transition to a new regional growth trajectory.  
 
The effects of the legacies of habits and routines established as constituent 
moments in the formation of the north east region‟s „traditional‟ economy are 
easily observed. Some of these were relatively permeable and transformable. 
For example, the strict gender division of labour established as a necessary 
part of the „old‟ industrial economy broke down. As male employment fell in 
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the coal mines, steelworks and shipyards, many of the „new‟ jobs attracted to 
replace them were in industries that targeted female wage labour (for 
example, clothing and consumer electronics, as well as a range of service 
activities). In part, this had been presaged during the First and Second World 
Wars, when shortages of civilian male labour because of conscription led to 
large-scale incorporation of women in factory work forces for the duration of 
the two Wars. Post-war, however, married women returned to their place as 
unpaid domestic workers „in the home‟ while unmarried women found work in 
a range of „female‟ industries and occupations, not least the expanding public 
sector services of education and health, performing „caring‟ work socially 
defined as appropriate for women. This is not to say that such transformations 
were smooth and uncontested; quite the contrary. There were protracted 
debates about the replacement of „male‟ with „female‟ jobs and many men 
found genuine difficulty in coming to terms with permanent unemployment and 
their role as domestic workers whilst their wives worked outside the home for 
a wage. Indeed, many women became both sole wage earner and carried on 
as the main unwaged domestic worker, bringing its own socio-psychological 
pressures and tensions.   
 
In other respects, however, established informal habits and routines proved 
much more resistant to change. For example, the „old‟ industrial economy had 
involved the construction of working class settlements to house workers close 
to their workplaces in the coal mine, factory or works. Archetypically, this 
involved the colliery, shipyard or steelworks at the end of the street, and a 
very short journey to work, typically on foot. Furthermore, sons would follow 
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fathers into jobs in these workplaces, often based on recruitment practices 
structured around networks of personal relations of family and friends. As a 
result, the educational aspirations of many boys were low, as they simply 
expected to follow in their father‟s footsteps in this way. Such training as was 
needed would, typically for most workers, be provided „on the job‟, via 
processes of learning-by-doing, learning-by-imitating and learning–by-
watching. With the closure of virtually all the workplaces in these industries, 
however, such individual trajectories through the labour market are no longer 
possible.  
 
The instituted legacies of the past remain, however, in three important ways in 
relation to people‟s commuting behaviour, activity spaces and aspirations and 
expectations about employment and work. All three represent examples of 
cognitive „lock-in‟ in terms of the ways in which people think of the labour 
market and their possibilities in it.  Firstly, there is a marked reluctance to 
commute, with even modest journeys-to-work of a few kilometres regarded as 
unreasonable. In many ways, the region remains a series of small, discrete 
and spatially bounded labour markets, rather than forming an integrated 
labour market in which people are linked to employment opportunities across 
the region. The distance from Newcastle to Middlesbrough, the towns at the 
heart of the region‟s northern and southern conurbations, is only 50 
kilometres, but per capita car ownership rates are low and public transport 
provision is often poor and expensive, which militates against intra-regional 
labour mobility. It is, however, important to qualify this by pointing out that 
there is a continuing imbalance between demand for and supply of labour in 
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the region, with many more people seeking waged work than there are 
available jobs in the region. One response to this has been a growth in long-
distance weekly commuting and international labour migration, albeit limited in 
extent  (Beynon et al, 1994).  
 
Secondly, there is a continuing legacy of recruitment into the „traditional‟ 
industries via sons following their fathers in terms of low expectations and 
limited ambition in terms of education and skills acquisition among many 
young people, especially but by no means wholly young men. This cognitive 
lock-in lives on despite the disappearance of the coal mines, shipyards and 
steelworks.  
 
Thirdly, there is an enduring culture of wage labour, a culture of dependency 
on wage labour and employment by others. People by and large expect to be 
employed in either private or public sector workplaces rather than to become 
self-employed, let alone employ others. This is not to say that there is an 
absence of entrepreneurial attitudes and ambitions, but it is it to recognise 
that these are not funnelled into the more conventional channels of SME 
formation and development. Such behaviour, especially when seen to be 
associated a reliance upon welfare state transfer payments2, is often regarded 
as one reason for the persistent failure of state policies that aim to encourage 
the formation of indigenous SMEs as the route to a new developmental 
trajectory in the north east. Many redundant workers have considered 
                                                 
2
 This raises important and more general questions as to the rights as well as responsibilities 
of citizens, not least their right to lead decent civilized lives in places that remain meaningful 
to them although abandoned by capital and the state as locations of production (see Hudson, 
2001, Chapter 8). 
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establishing their own businesses but have taken the economically very 
rational decision not to do so. They are acutely aware that the possibilities of 
successful SME development are very slim in regional and sub-regional 
economies that are profoundly depressed by the effects of permanent, large-
scale unemployment and lack of waged work in a thriving formal sector 
economy. Many regard investing redundancy payments in their home (albeit 
one that they will have great difficulty selling should they subsequently decide 
to move in search of work) as a safer and more rational investment of their 
money. In some cases, former industrial workers display considerable 
entrepreneurial ability and ingenuity in developing business in the informal 
sector or in or on the fringes of the illegal „black economy‟. 
 
Cognitive and institutional lock-in also exists in the more formal realms of 
governance, regulation and the state. The origins of regional policy in and for 
north east England can be traced back to the 1920s and 1930s. During this 
period a cross-class regionalist alliance, dominated by major capitalist 
interests, successfully lobbied central government and used their political 
influence and power to push for the creation of new forms of regional policy. 
This centred on the attraction of new industries and inward investment to 
diversify the regional economy and labour market, and helped create new 
opportunities for capital based in the region while seeking to protect existing 
capitalist interests and the jobs that they provided. This policy was intensified 
following the ending of the Second World War, both via strengthened forms of 
regional policy to attract new branch plant investment and via the 
nationalisation of sectors that were central to the regional economy (coal 
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mining, iron and steel production, rail transport). This was allied to policy 
innovations such as the creation of New Towns as an integral part of 
settlement policies. Public sector infrastructure investment was concentrated 
in key settlements („growth points‟ and „zones‟), with the intention that these 
became more attractive to private sector investment, seeking to bring together 
new employment and people in selected locations (Hudson, 1982). With 
varying emphases, these policies remained in place for some three decades, 
and in certain important respects their legacy in terms of cognitive and policy 
lock-in within the state continues to the present. 
 
The implementation of these policies required the assignment of new, related 
powers and responsibilities to existing state organisations (for example, the 
planning responsibilities given to local government). It also required the 
construction of new formal institutional arrangements in the region. Many of 
these took the form of appointed quasi-state organisations (such as the New 
Town Development Corporations and the Regional Economic Planning 
Council, established in the 1960s), with little electoral accountability in the 
region because their members were appointed by central government. These 
bodies tended to be manned (the choice of verb is deliberate) by the same 
combination of representatives of capital and organised labour as had lobbied 
for and run the new institutions of the inter-war and war-time periods. As a 
result, they became locked into a conception of the „regional problem‟ that 
centred on notions of industrial obsolescence, old industries and derelict and 
polluted built and natural environments that required „modernisation‟ as a pre-
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condition to attracting fresh rounds of manufacturing branch plant investment, 
increasingly from outside the UK (Hudson, 1989).  
 
As the limits to this response became increasingly clear in the 1970s, the 
policy prescription switched from state to private ownership, from large to 
small firms, from manufacturing to service sector activities, from inward 
investment to indigenous growth. This was no more than a reflection of 
dominant perceptions of the causes of growth in more economically 
successful regions. As such, the transition to a more market-oriented 
approach was embraced and actively promoted with some enthusiasm by 
some public sector policy makers in the region, often encouraged by 
consultants that they hired to give advice on developmental strategies for the 
region (for example, see Northern Regional Strategy Team, 1977). Others 
were much more sceptical, more wedded to a stronger directive role for the 
state, so that there were tensions within the public policy community.  These 
tensions were often exacerbated by the effects of the new policy priorities. For 
example, the influx of call centres was evidence of new service sector growth 
but in activities that reproduced a „branch plant‟ syndrome of unskilled, low 
wage work in establishments controlled by firms located outside the north east 
and vulnerable to competition from lower wage locations in south east Asia 
and Russia.  
 
In short, official conceptions of public policy, of the causes of the „regional 
problem‟ and of appropriate policy responses to it, remained locked into a 
restricted conceptual space. This left no alternative to the contradictions of 
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particular forms of state engagement with economy and society and the 
decline of some sorts of private sector activities, other than the 
encouragement of different sorts of private sector activities, as the limits of 
existing policies became increasingly visible.  The market as resource 
allocation mechanism became increasingly seen, normatively, as the right and 
proper solution to the „regional problem‟. If it failed to produce prosperity in the 
north east, this reflected failings in and of the region, to be addressed by 
people in the region, allied to appropriate supply side policies. These varied 
shifts increasingly formed integral components of a more general shift away 
from the long post-war social democratic consensus towards a new neo-
liberal governmentality.  
 
 
New modes of regulation, new governmentalities: seeking to break out 
of lock-in   
 
In the preceding sections I have argued that we can conceptualise the 
trajectory of socio-economic change in north east England in terms of path 
contingency and dependency, encompassing various forms of lock-in and 
instituted behaviour. I have suggested that the state had a central role in 
these processes of continuity and change in this quintessentially state- 
managed region. The state was centrally involved both in creating and 
reinforcing lock-in to ensure path dependent development between the late 
1920s and mid-1970s and subsequently seeking erode such lock-in to 
facilitate new developmental trajectories. This has involved seeking to 
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address the problems posed to such a transition, especially in terms of the 
attitudes and behaviour of people in the region as part of neo-liberal supply–
side approaches. In this section, I further explore such issues via concepts of 
regulation, governance and governmentality.  
 
Regulationist approaches emphasise the social and political grounding of the 
economy and the non-random coupling between a particular regime of 
accumulation and the social mode of regulation that makes it possible (Boyer, 
1990; MaCleod, 1997).  The latter encompasses both the formal regulatory 
mechanisms of the state apparatus and a range of non-state regulatory 
mechanisms located in the spaces of civil society – that is, processes of both 
government and governance. While stressing the centrality of the coupling 
between accumulation and the political and social conditions that make it 
possible, however, regulationist approaches have little to say about the actual 
practices of government, or about how particular modes of thought and policy 
styles become (and cease to be) dominant, even hegemonic. Thus 
regulationist approaches tend to assume the existence of forms of lock-in and 
the persistence of instituted practices but have little to say about their 
(re)production. They have even less to say about how one set of practices is 
replaced by another and radically different set as a shift from one coupling to 
another is enacted.  
 
There have been attempts to address such issues, however. For example, 
Jessop (1990) seeks to build upon regulationist perspectives by drawing 
together neo-Gramscian ideas as to how hegemonic practices are channelled 
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through complex ensembles of institutions dispersed throughout civil society 
with Foucault‟s “capillary” notion of power in theorising the mechanisms of 
state power and knowledge. This views of power as fluid and relational, 
exercised from innumerable points within civil society, the economy and the 
state, in productive networks of power that extend beyond the state. 
Nonetheless, Foucault privileged the role of the state (the “macro-physics of 
power”) as “the point of strategic codification of the multitude of power 
relations (“the micro-physics of power”) and the apparatus in which 
hegemony, meta-power, class domination and „sur pouvoir‟ are organised” 
(Jessop, 1990, 239). As such, the state is centrally located in relation to 
processes of regulation but the specific ways in which state power is 
developed and deployed vary. Consequently, in theorising the state, it is 
necessary to allow a significant degree of autonomy to state apparatuses and 
allow for variation in the administrative manner, style and logic by which the 
state regulates economy and society as it undertakes the practical tasks of 
“real regulation” (Clark, 1992). Practices of implementation can decisively 
shape regional development trajectories. 
 
The Foucauldian concept of „governmentality‟ emphasises the practices of 
government and governance (Dean, 1999) and further illuminates these 
issues. Governmentality “is intrinsically linked to the activities of expertise, 
whose role is not one of weaving an all-pervasive web of „social control‟, but 
of enacting assorted attempts at the calculated administration of diverse 
aspects of conduct through the countless, often competing, local tactics of 
education, persuasion, inducement, management, incitement, motivation and 
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encouragement” (MacKinnon, 2000, 296). However, concentrations of expert 
knowledge can unintentionally give rise to “enclosures”, tightly bound sites of 
vigorously defended professional expertise, resistant to the wishes of 
government (Rose and Miller, 1992, 190).  
 
Moreover, such the practices of governmentality are territorially demarcated. 
Space is an important element of governmentality because “to govern it is 
necessary to render visible the space over which government is to be 
exercised. And this is not simply a matter of looking: space has to be re-
presented, marked out” (Thrift, 2002, 205). This thereby locates the space of 
the state as one element in wider circuits of power and moves from a position 
that sees the state as simply an explanation of other events to one that 
regards the specific activities of the state as themselves something to be 
explained. The black box of the state must be opened up in order to explain 
how it can perform with a degree of functional coherence.  As Jessop (1990, 
229) puts it, such internal coherence can only be achieved through the 
successful realisation of specific “state projects” which unites state agencies 
and officials behind a distinct line of action.  Achieving such unity is thereby a 
contingent matter. Even if it is achieved, however, there is no guarantee that 
such projects will always and only have their intended effects, as the 
developmental history of the north east makes abundantly clear. 
 
These concepts of regulation, governance and governmentality allow 
exploration of three sets of issues pertaining to that developmental history. 
The first concerns the relations between the „regional problem‟ and notions of 
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governmentality, linked to the transition (initially in the 1920s) from an analytic 
recognition of regional uneven development to the political identification of 
„problem regions‟. A key issue here is the ways in which „problem regions‟ are 
made visible, constituted as objects of state policy via the construction of 
regional statistics, regional plans (with their focus on outputs) and regional 
strategies (with their focus on process and outcomes). Furthermore, there are 
important connections between the ways in which the „regional problem‟ is 
defined and the perception of appropriate forms of regional policies to tackle 
it. This may involve seeking to help reinforce or to change forms of instituted 
behaviour and secure or alter the existing developmental trajectory.  
 
The evolution in emphasis from plans (for example, Teesside County Borough 
Council, 1972) via strategic plans (Northern Regional Strategy Team, 1977) to 
strategies (ONE North East, 2000) is linked to a political shift from 
predominantly social-democratic politics to a neo-liberal politics. The UK state 
was at the forefront of making this transition, given particular impetus by the 
Thatcher governments‟ of the 1980s and continued in the subsequent era of 
“New Labour”. This has entailed a shift from a belief in the possibility, 
legitimacy and validity of socially–progressive re-distributive planning via 
central state action to one that embraces the market as the main economic 
steering mechanism. This had definite implications for people in the north east 
as the state sought to cut back the extent of its direct engagement with 
economy and society there and, not entirely successfully, to encourage 
greater mobility in the labour market and encourage entrepreneurial 
behaviour. This switch also lends a certain political specificity to the 
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experiences of the UK, as neo-liberalism penetrated widely into policy 
domains - competition, industrial and technology, employment and social - 
with spatially differentiating results, as well as into those of urban and regional 
policy. As such, the shift to neo-liberalism radically re-drew the boundaries 
between state, economy and civil society, at least in part because of fears of 
a fiscal crisis of the state, to create a UK-specific variant among the “many 
national capitalisms” (Schmidt, 2002) of neo-liberal late modernity.  
 
Part of this re-drawing of the boundaries has involved re-defining the 
geometry of state power, with a decentralisation of responsibility for regional 
development issues to the regional level within the state. Thus the region 
became socially constituted as an active subject in seeking to resolve the 
regional problem, the second issue that I want to consider here. Rather than 
regional policies designed and administered by the central state, there is now 
a more complex multi-level system of governance that conjoins EU, national, 
regional and sub-regional in a more complex geometry. However, these new 
arrangements devolve greater responsibilities to regional and sub-regional 
levels for dealing with issues of regional economic development and 
regeneration. This has been emphasised within the region by the creation of 
the ONE North East Regional Development Agency, the four sub-regional 
partnerships to which it devolves most of its budget, and the Local Strategic 
Partnerships now being established across the region under the leadership of 
Local Authorities (Liddle and Townsend, 2002).  
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It is important to emphasise that these are not simply changes imposed 
externally upon the region. There were social forces within the region arguing 
in favour of such changes, with local politicians wanting greater 
decentralisation of power and resources to their authorities and an emergent 
small but vociferous lobby seeking a regional assembly and much greater 
regional autonomy. In principle, these three levels are intended to produce a 
seamless web of „joined up‟ socio-economic development and regeneration 
policies in the region, with a heavy emphasis upon “cluster” polices in 
economic development. Practice deviates somewhat from this principle, 
however – and there is scant recognition that successful “cluster” policies 
could engender precisely the forms of lock-in that were previously seen as a 
diagnostic feature of the regional problem. 
 
The emergent emphasis on regional and sub-regional strategies reflects a 
perception within neo-liberal policy circles and the UK state as to the need to 
balance two competing tensions. Firstly, pressures arising from a perception 
as to the technical impossibility and normative undesirability of planning within 
the social relations of capitalism, and the uncertainties and unpredictabilities 
that these unavoidably create. Secondly, socio-political pressures for the state 
to be seen to be concerned with issues of democratic accountability and 
socio-spatial inequality. Responsibility for regional issues in north east 
England, however, has often been devolved to central government appointed 
QUANGOS (such as Urban Development #corporations). This has generated 
new forms of „democratic deficit‟ as these organisations are politically 
unaccountable within the region, with evident dangers in undermining the 
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credibility of the case for devolving power as part of a new governmentality 
through which to address regional development problems (Beynon et al, 
1994).  
 
In addition, decentralisation to the regional level has often involved greater 
reliance on institutions within civil society acting together („in partnership‟) with 
regional, sub-regional and/or local state organisations. The notion of 
‟partnership‟ and collaborative working at and between these levels is 
important, although not all partners have equal power and influence in the 
partnership. In particular, many partnerships remain dominated or led by parts 
of the state. Even so, partnership signals a blurring of the boundaries 
between market, state and civil society as processes of governance partially 
replace those of government. Allied to this, there has been a discernible 
tendency towards „the community‟ as both subject and object of intra-regional 
policies to tackle uneven development. This in turn has often been linked to 
an emphasis upon the „third sector‟ or social economy as the route to tackling 
„regional problems‟ and problems of intra-regional regeneration (Amin et al, 
2002).  
 
The turn to the third sector signals recognition that state policy attempts to 
break unwanted forms of lock-in, for example by encouraging greater labour 
mobility and entrepreneurial activity via establishing SMEs, have largely been 
ineffectual. People wish to remain in their places but not to become 
entrepreneurs in the formal mainstream economy. The growing focus upon 
the social economy is recognition both of this and the fact that increasingly 
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large swathes of the territory of regions such as north east England now fall 
outside the decisive circuits of capital. They have been eviscerated by capital 
flight and effectively abandoned by the state beyond a residual commitment to 
maintain a minimum level of welfare provision there. However, it is precisely 
the impoverished condition of such places that militates against the 
development of a vibrant „alternative‟ social economy there, amplified by a 
more general state suspicion of potentially “subversive” social economies 
such as LETS (Local Exchange Trading Systems). Thus the turn to the social 
economy represents an attempt to reconcile tensions between immanent 
accumulation and rationality crises on the one hand and legitimation crises on 
the other as both capital and the national state lose interest in the region as a 
space for the production of surplus value. In its turn, however, it creates 
political tensions at local and regional levels as the developmental limits of the 
social economy become clear. For example, over much of north east 
England, the social economy is most notable by its absence, particularly in 
those areas in which it is needed most (Amin et al, 2002), and where it does 
develop tends to reproduce the socio-economic inequalities of the 
mainstream within it (Bowring, 199x). . 
 
The third issue that I want to consider also flows directly from this growing 
marginalisation of the region in the concerns of capital and the national state. 
This is the emergence of Task Forces as a characteristic policy response of 
the new neo-liberal governmentality and, more particularly, of the particular 
politics of „New Labour‟ to tackle place and/or industry specific problems of 
economic decline. There are marked similarities between such Task Forces 
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and the “project teams” that have come to characterise much of the 
contemporary economy (Grabher, 2002). Such Task Forces have exploded in 
number and have become endemic in north east England – though not only 
there. They have been established as ad hoc bodies intended to deal flexibly 
and rapidly with specific policy problems, typically associated with the 
(un)expected decline of a particular industry or sector (including coal mining, 
clothing, electronics, steel, textiles) and its consequences on the places in 
which it was formerly concentrated (Pike, 2002). Others seek to arrest or 
reverse decline – for example the Teesside Chemical Initiative (Chapman, 
2003) for reasons that are explicable in terms of sub-regional politics and the 
difficulties of imagining Teesside without chemical production, rather than a 
more realistic assessment of the global political-economy of chemicals 
production. The membership of these bodies consists of a mix of private and 
public sector representatives, typically drawn from a cast of “usual suspects”. 
Self-defined key players in the region find new niches in these partnerships 
from which to exercise power and preserve their own influence (Robinson and 
Shaw, 2000), often drawn together around notions of partnership and 
perception of a shared regional interest (as they first were in the 1930s). They 
can be characterised as non-statutory (that is, non-QUANGO) and multi-
agency organisations, with selected and defined membership, with initially an 
indeterminate but always temporary lifespan. Typically, however, like the 
earlier QUANGOS they are opaque, unaccountable, closed off to wider 
political and public scrutiny, with the hand of central government often 
prominent and with limited links to and co-ordination with the actions of other 
public policy bodies.  Fundamentally, they are designed to mop up and paper 
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over the consequences of economic decline, a combination of sticking plaster 
and sponge. They symbolise the transition from a concern with planning to 
one with strategy, understood as developing ad hoc ways of coping with the 
consequences of unplanned, unexpected and emergent changes in economic 
circumstances in a region marked by long-term structural economic decline.  
 
 
 
Concluding comments 
 
In this paper, I have argued that concepts of path contingent and dependent 
development, instituted behaviour, especially in terms of cognitive and policy 
lock-in, and governmentality allow a deepened, more nuanced understanding 
of the changing position of regions such as north east England in/out of 
processes and circuits of capital accumulation. They thus facilitate a better 
understanding of processes of regional uneven development. Allied to 
structural political-economy understandings, they help reveal more subtle 
perspectives upon the practices of key social actors that recognise the power 
of structural constraints while revealing more about the determination of 
regional developmental trajectories within them. 
 
Finally, by way of conclusion, I want to make some brief comments about the 
broader implications of the approach to understanding regional change that I 
have explored. While the empirical focus in this paper has been on a single 
region, the north east of England, this region exists, as it has done for 
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centuries, as part of a global political-economy. Other regions have 
experienced similar trajectories of growth, decline and occasionally renewal. 
The approach explored here could, therefore, be used as the basis both for 
analysis of other regions - both other declining “old industrial regions” and 
contemporary “hot spots” of growth - and for inter-regional comparative 
analysis. Focusing upon the determinants of trajectories of change and the 
specific institutional forms of different regions could help unravel the reasons 
as to why regions change in varying ways – some as “winners”, some as 
“losers” - within the structural limits of a capitalist political economy. As such, 
it could help throw light on the key questions as to how and why regions 
experience different forms and trajectories of change, as to how the fortunes 
of different regions relate to one another and of how regional change both 
reflects and helps reproduce those systemic limits. The growing inter-
connections between regions within a neo-liberal globalising economy in the 
twenty first century further reinforce the case for deepening understanding of 
the co-evolution of regional development trajectories.  
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